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In their mythologies all cultures objectify and intensify the characteristics of self-per­
ception the causes of which they — according to the level of civilization — transfer to both 
inner and outer nature. The texts of all creation myths treat then with varying features the 
constellation of the three great symbols: God, Nature, Man. Diverse are the rules by which 
they can be combined. The Lord­of­the­World rule, for example, privileges God above na­
ture and man. Genesis 1 makes use of this rule, but with a disconcerting inconsistency in its 
application. In the course of the biblical tale, God and man become more alike, so that man 
may consider himself sovereign over nature, closer to God than some stalk planted by hu­
man hands, or some insect categorized by human intellect. 
In order to avoid a disquieting confusion between God and man, the status of the Divine 
later was subsequently enhanced metaphysically. "Creatura non potest creare", as the 
Church Fathers and scholastics used to say. Only God is capable of creation without mate­
rial. He is a Being in a vacuum, and nevertheless the centre of a tangible world, which he 
conjured up from the void.1) The Genesis text explains how this can be understood in a 
mirror­image reversal: God calls the world into being with his very words. The first creator 
— it can hence be later said — is the first poet. In an anthropological perspective, this 
means poiesis ex nihilo: i.e. God is a human invention without an empirical basis, a non-
derivable symbol of the over­determined abilities of man. 
This tradition is translated into an anthropomorphic image in Michelangelo's fresco of 
the creation in the Sistine Chapel. The original poet, produced by the need for something 
completely different and yet recognizable, points to Adam, the first man, who reciprocates, 
pointing back toward God. Michelangelo's powerful image does not preclude the possibili­
ty that man, according to Marsilio Ficino, is quidam deus, a kind of god2), a secondary god 
(homo secundus deus) to whom mother nature (the matter) is entrusted. Man in analogy to 
prima causa, may creatively refashion, if not improve upon her. 
During the Renaissance creative man enters the European stage as the great leader of 
cultural evolution: a sign of the emancipation of arts and sciences from the authoritative 
blueprints of the cosmologies and theological world­views. This problematizes human cre­
ation, so that the "second god", creative man, is soon distinguished by name from the arti­
san who, according to the instructions of a metaphysically induced plan, must shape a given 
1) Cf. Vinzenz Riifner: "Homo secundus Deus. Eine geistesgeschichtliche Studie zum menschlichen 
Schopfertum". In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 63 (1955), 255 seqq. 
2) Riifner op. cit., 271. 
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material. But even the homo artifex is reflected larger than life in the gods as well, from the 
myths of Demiurgos in classical antiquity to those medieval depictions of the Christian God 
as a craftsman, holding the book of ideas or wisdom in one hand, and the scales of geome­
try or a compass in the other.3) 
The new name "Genius", which implies creative impulse instead of imitation, goes hand 
in hand with a social and aesthetic distinction unknown until the dawning of the modern 
age. It is a name which grants its recipient — as the early Latin form ingenium shows —, a 
power which is equally inexplicable as nature's powers of creation: "Homo creator nascitur, 
non fit." Creative man seems to be more a child of nature than of culture. Therefore he ap­
pears especially suited to making lasting changes to the earthly world, because nature, ac­
cording to an early view, does not operate by leaps and bounds, but goes its way continu­
ously and inexorably. 
With this shift of meaning in the relationship among the three great symbols God, na­
ture, and man, marking the beginning of the modern age, the interest in the natural world 
shifts to the centre of cultural activity. At first, it becomes tangible in the inflationary use of 
the imitation­of­nature formula which refers to the imitation of nature's inherent power to 
create well in the eighteenth century.4) But this doctrine is gradually removed from aware­
ness, so that the process of cultivation and civilization inevitably leads to a loss of nature. 
Jean­Jacques Rousseau is well known as one of the originators of such an awareness. In 
his paradox concerning the history of arts and sciences, in the first Discours of 1750, he 
takes up the phrase "je ne sais quoi", referring to the inexplicability and naturalness of ge­
nius.5) Rousseau continues by citing as examples the founding figures of scientific analysis: 
Bacon, Descartes, Newton. They ran, as he writes, through an immeasurable course full of 
obstacles in order to achieve their goal: the scientific genius as the runner constantly in mo­
tion, who overcomes all resistance.6) An image of progress emerges which the French en­
cyclopedia article "Genie" (on which Diderot at least collaborated) further develops a few 
years later: "Le mouvement, qui est son etat naturel, est quelquefois si doux qu'a peine il 
l 'apercoit: mais le plus souvent ce mouvement excite des tempetes, & le genie est plutot 
emporte par un torrent d'idees." Curiosity, the author adds, is the driving force (leur mo­
bile) and the desire to discover sets the genius in motion.7) Nature's mobility is still includ­
ed in the scene of cultural cosmology. However, attention is then drawn to anomaly, name­
ly that abrupt, unpredictable phenomenon which simultaneously accelerates the process of 
cultural development and forces the traditional hierarchy God­nature­man to collapse. 
3) Milton C. Nahm: "Creativity in Art". In: Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. I, New York 1973, 577­589. 
As to the absence of a creativity discourse in Antiquity cf. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz: Geschichte der Asthetik, 
vol. I: Die Asthetik der Antike, Basel/Stuttgart 1979, 51 et pass. 
4) Cf. Hans Blumenberg: "Nachahmung der Natur". Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schopferischen Menschen, 
in: H.B.: Wirklichkeiten, in denen wir leben. Stuttgart 1981, 72seqq. 
5) Rudolf Wittkower: "Genius: Individualism in Art and Artists". In: Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. II, 
New York 1973, 305. 
6) Rousseau: CEuvres completes, II, ed. M. Launay, Paris 1972, 68: "C'est par les premiers obstacles qu'ils ont 
appris a faire des efforts, et qu'ils se sont exerces a franchir l'espace immense qu'ils ont parcouru." 
7) Encyclopedic Tome 7, Paris 1757, 583. Cf. also the article Eclecticisme, quoted by Herbert Dieckmann: 
Studien zur europdischen Aufkldrung, Mtinchen 1974, 17, note 19. 
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Henceforth movement, storms, and raging rivers belong to the standardized inventory of 
metaphors in the widespread debate about man's creativity. Even Francis Bacon's 
Instauratio Magna opens with a frontispiece which allegorically depicts progress in the sci­
ences as a circumnavigation of the "Orbis Intellectualis".8) Around 1667, in the reports of 
the English Royal Society, parallels are often drawn to the voyages of Columbus: Newton, 
we read in a report of the Royal Society, is the "Columbus of the heavens", given the task 
of discovering "an America of knowledge". Additionally, Edward Young's influential 
work Conjectures on Original Composition (1759) celebrates Bacon as a brilliant traveler 
through the world of reason and as an example of the discoverer of the aesthetic worlds hid­
den within. Thus Young seeks to tear himself away from the doctrine of imitation.9) 
Meanwhile, the allegory of the voyage of discovery limits creative activity to a more or 
less methodical search for existing spiritual and artistic continents which remain hidden, ne­
glecting thus invention and innovation. Admittedly, the actions of the circumnavigators are 
interpreted as something heroic, since they defy the dangers of untamed natural elements. 
Therefore invention is considered as truly heroic as a founding action which stems from an 
unquestionable origo and establishes a new efficacious order. The belief that man could 
tame nature and channel its wild resources corresponds to his trust in the power of inven­
tion. Already at an early stage, comparisons are drawn in this context between inventors 
and heroes, a kind of demigods, and the gods of classical antiquity. Who hasn't heard of 
Prometheus in this context? This ancient figure is especially interesting as a parabolic rep­
resentation: he personifies man's cares about the future which as a self­relying being he 
must control, because he is an incomplete, an imperfect being. Prometheus simultaneously 
personifies the power to create culture and the sufferings which result from rebelling 
against the old order.10) 
The power of invention, however, the only means through which the genius is able to 
define himself as a Promethean worker, is in all theories the plastic, that is, the formable 
and form­destroying imagination or fantasy. In the figure of Prometheus, who is neither the 
subject nor the object of worship, the concurrent nature­taming and ­exploiting potentials 
are embodied much more convincingly than in a god of creation. But for the artistic genius 
in an emphatic sense, this is not enough. He seeks to be distinguished from the technical­
scientific genius by means of a specific strategy of "stepping out of oneself . This is an at­
titude of mental distortion called enthusiasm, which Shaftesbury and the Abbe Du Bos had 
already contemplated with different results at the beginning of the century. In the course of 
the debate, the ancient concept of enthusiasm took on a new sense, implicitly indicating a 
turning away from the old judeo­christian conviction that man resembles God and is noth­
ing except his tenant on earth. This was a crucial step in liberating human imagination as 
8) Bernhard Fabian: "Der Naturwissenschaftler als Originalgenie". In: Europdische Aufkldrung, ed. H. 
Friedrich/F. Schalk, Miinchen 1967, 51. 
9) Cf. the German translation by H.E. von Teubern [1760]: Gedanken iiber die Original-Werke, ed. G. Sauder, 
Heidelberg 1977, 60. 
10) Cf. Raymond Trousson: Le Theme de Promethee dans la litterature europeenne, 2 vols, Genf 1964. 
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potential self-design from the doom of clerical Control. 
Only imagination is capable, as formulated by the Scottish scholars William Duff and 
Alexander Gerard, of bringing out "new truths", "new images", "new associations", even 
"new sensations". The Swiss critic Breitinger and the German philosopher Baumgarten 
once again use the Columbian turning point as a metaphor and speak of "new worlds"; the 
young Goethe insists on "a new creation".11) 
New worlds, new creation, these are the unifying categories, but their polemic counter­
part must be sought in the old order. The genius as an agent of the new (order) should not 
supersede the old (order) by retrogression into the past. On the contrary, as most writers are 
convinced, genius produces the new order as a figure of origin in a moment or flash. 
Genius interrupts continuity and displaces the normative standards of tradition. This is es­
pecially evident in those cases where its dealings are now over­interpreted analogously to 
creatio ex nihilo. Tradition becomes a repertoire to be used at will, a repertoire that has to 
be constructed according to laws which are not given but set as a task. 
As early as in the seventeenth century, it was said of Shakespeare, as the compulsory 
symbol of creative man for the following generation of poets, that he threw away the optical 
lense of the book in order to search for nature within himself. The inner voice is the voice 
of free imagination which renounces all authority. It is a hidden nature, not directly acces­
sible to either perception or conceptual description; in other words, a nature which takes on 
paradoxical features in the context of aesthetic considerations, operating with an innate ne­
cessity. This inner voice sets free that arbitrariness which distinguishes man as a self­creat­
ing being from all other animals. While the Scottish scholars still concede to genius the ar­
bitrary combination of memories, others attempt to free it completely from the burden of 
tradition. Thus the modern genius turns out to be a virtuoso of oblivion not belonging to 
historical changes. "II devance son siecle qui ne peut le suivre," says the French ency­
clopaedia. Diderot identifies genius with the "esprit prophetique"; La Mettrie uses the term 
as a synonym for the power of imagination which, like nature, incessantly destroys and just 
as often renews itself.12) 
As it is indicated in the advanced theories of genius, the arbitrariness of the creative 
subject in dealing with given examples, categorical terms, norms and rules, can be de­
scribed as a free, autonomous play of imagination. Here an arbitrariness shows up that 
seems to be the real substance of human creativity. In this arbitrariness, the self­relation of 
the creating subject turns up in front of its own consciousness, and hence his objective work 
becomes legible as an autograph that seems relatively free of external coercion. To this day 
the rational intellect often claims for itself the role of a ponderous, grouchy, inhibiting and 
11) William Duff: An Essay on Genius [1767], ed. J.L, Mahoney, Gainesville 1964, 89. Alexander Gerard: An 
Essay on Genius [1774], ed. B. Fabian, Miinchen 1966, 30, 64. Joh. Jacob Breitinger: Critische Dichtkunst, 
Zurich 1740, 110 seqq. Alexander G. Baumgarten: Aesthetica (1750/58), § 511; Joh. Wolfgang Goethe: "Zum 
Schakespears Tag" [1771]. In: Berliner Ausgabe, vol. 17, 188. 
12) Encyclopedie op. cit., 584. Cf. also Dieckmann op. cit., 24. Julien Offray de La Mettrie: L'homme machine, 
suivi de L'Art de jouir, ed. M. Solovine, Paris 1921, 92: "c 'est ainsi que l ' imagination, veritable image du 
temps, se detruit et se renouvelle sans cesse." 
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directing power. Indeed, the relationship between the powers of reason and imagination has 
long been a controversial topic. In the course of the eighteenth century, however, the status 
of imagination was gradually enhanced, so that its range of effect soon reached from intu­
itive cognition to aesthetic expansion of ordinary experience. But that was definitely true 
for all acts which could be considered creative in political, military and technical practice as 
well as in the arts and sciences. The difference between labour and artistic creation was 
therefore almost negligible for the early theorists in the creativity discourse. In the figure of 
genius they apparently wanted to show that man is generally able to determine his own evo­
lution, taking the future form of his civilized world in his own hands. The enhanced status 
of the imagination had consequences for the attitude of the European to both his own tradi­
tion and non­European cultures as well. To a certain extent this enhancement loosened up 
the rational space­time control mechanisms of chronography and geography and brought 
forth poetically, dynamically changing structures. Here anything and everything may be 
combined: In the light of this view, Shakespeare and Pindar are contemporaries, and the 
Orient or Athens is located on the foothills of the Alps or on the banks of the river Rhine. 
In this manner, an important chapter in creative change was induced, because it removed re­
strictions from the conventional world­views and gave them a dynamic touch by means of 
imagination. Henceforth, there emerged a kind of syncretism, which soon distinguished 
European civilization from all others. 
In the free play of imagination, doctrines are shattered, and the barriers between sensual 
perception and intellectual analysis are torn down. Abstractions and illusions (fantomes) 
are called into being (paraphrase of the Encyclopedic article)13)' passion disregards the 
moral distinction between good and evil, and fantasy ignores the logical distinction between 
true and untrue. Therein lies, as the Encyclopedic author knows, a danger for the political 
and practical consequences of cultural creation. In these fields of action the indifference of 
genius, evident in the arbitrary play of its imagination, makes it possible to topple or found 
states (renverser ou [...] fonder les etats).14) Here the ambivalence of genius can either de­
stroy man's fate or make him happy. What appears to the genius in his blindness to be cre­
ative, might ultimately be a destructive act. The "torrent of ideas", which sweeps along the 
genius in a passionately heightened state of imagination, for example in enthusiasm, re­
mains for him a fascinating spectacle which promises the observer an intensification of his 
own passions and imaginations. 
Intensified sensation and heightened imagination are impulses for the enthusiastic over­
coming of inhibiting barriers, components of self­creation inherent in the evolution of the 
European sense of self­awareness. The second half of the eighteenth century fuses the con­
cept of heightened self­perception with the view that man is more than the sum of his no­
tions, if these be only of a theological or scientific origin. 
This is well documented in the historio­philosophic and aesthetic concepts introduced 
into discourse by numerous German writers at the end of the eighteenth century. 
13) Encyclopedie op. cit., 583. Cf. also Diderot's letter addressed to S. Volland, dated 31.7.1762. 
14) Encyclopedie ibid. 
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Genius, however, remained for this epoch a symbol of humanity coming into its own, 
and of the artistic spirit which overcame temporal as well as spatial boundaries. The work 
of genius represents the exceeding of that which is, and its boundless creative imagination 
privileges the secular prophet who anticipates that which does not yet exist. In the genius' 
works which — according to a quotation by Schiller — abolish the difference between 
signs and referents, there exist the energies which strive to overcome current deficiencies.15) 
In the aesthetic abolition of the unabolishable difference between language signs and the 
signified, the artistic work apparently anticipates reconciliation which is denied to the nor­
mal consciousness. At the same time, the artwork closes itself to the demands of this con­
sciousness, whose world with its own system of laws reproaches this for betraying the idea 
of creativity. 
As early as the genius­crazed 1760's and 1770's, a greater differentiation in the concept 
of creativity develops which not only characterizes an irrational or mystical cult of ge­
nius. 16) On the level of figurative speech, the most unusual expressions make themselves 
the centre of attention. Many admirers of genius, above all within the German­speaking 
area, lapse into an enthusiastic tone for the energetic and electrifying effects of genius. 
They write large numbers of interjections and bold metaphors in elliptical sentences. This 
accorded not only approval, but also ridicule.17) That which is granted to the genius, the 
conscious infringement of grammatical rules and of the precept of clarity, is practiced not 
least of all by its admirers: Rousseau in his eulogy of the musical genius, Herder and Goethe 
in their essays on Shakespeare. For Lavater it is "propior deus", God's relative which he 
also calls "Zentralgeist", pointing through that towards an anthropocentric world­vision.18) 
The features of a cult­like appearance are obvious, because genius can no longer be 
compared with methodically proceeding explorers. His way — Lavater adds — "is always 
the way of lightning, or of the tempest, or of the eagle".19) These formulations evoke the 
unleashed energies of nature, including, significantly, its destructive powers: the genius is 
allowed to make deals with all powers. The figure of Faust emerges when Lavater notes 
that whatever is supposedly assigned to the genius does not come from man, but rather from 
God or Satan.20) 
The image of the eagle also belongs to the many topoi of grandeur appropriate for the 
genius. Diderot, Herder, Goethe, Lavater, Schiller, Stolberg, the list could go on, all make 
use of it. The eagle is an image which symbolizes not only ascent but also mediation be­
15) Friedrich Schiller: "Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung" [1795]. In: F.S.: Samtliche Werke, ed. G. 
Fricke/H.G. Gopfert, V, Munchen 1959, 706. 
16) Jochen Schmidt: Die Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens 1750-1945,1: Von der Aufklarung bis zum Idealismus, 
Darmstadt 1985. 
17) To quote Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Schriften undBriefe, ed. W. Promies, I, Munchen 1980, 449: "Eine 
deutliche kalte Definition von Genie verhalt sich zu einem Feuerstrom, wie eine niitzliche Lehre zu einer 
Ohrfeige." 
18) Johann Caspar Lavater: Physiognomische Fragmente zur Befdrderung der Menschenkenntnis und 
Menschenliebe, IV, Leipzig/Winterthur 1778 (Repr. Zurich 1969), 81. 
19) Lavater op. cit., 81 seqq. 
20) Lavater op. cit., 83. 
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tween Olympus and the earthly world. This allusion can be compared with the prevalent 
figure of the angel, although it is unclear whether it is a good or a fallen angel.21) 
To sum up: as his literary iconography shows, creative man grows taller than his own 
limits of reason into that eerie zone of grandeur which Edmund Burke's Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757) studied in tak­
ing up the classical treatise of Pseudo­Longinus' De Sublimitate. The meaning is obvious: 
genius, creative man in his highest form, is incommensurable, eluding ordinary judgement. 
Genius cannot be identified simply by definition — it is not a case for logical thinking but 
for sensitive experience: "II est mieux senti que connu par l'homme qui veut le definir", we 
read in the now commonplace entry in Encyclopedie. 
If it can only be "felt", then it presupposes a sensibility in the feeling subject which is 
equal to that of the sensed. "A genius can only be ignited by another genius", writes 
Lessing in his well­known seventeenth "Literaturbrief" (1759). In the language of the 
time, the third binding agent is nature. Of course, there actually is no third agent between 
nature and genius itself, as Diderot remarks: "II n'y a point d'intermediate entre la nature 
et le genie".22) Translated into our language: that which is genius or creative can only be 
experienced, not measured or described with the help of an intermediary concept. Even 
more, that which genius shows, that it can not understand itself and can not be defined, but 
only experienced, is also true for its works. Therefore, Schiller's thesis of the identity of 
signs with their referents is also another argument in favour of the incomparability and in­
definability of the work genius brought forth. From this follows a new form of critique in 
which the difference between the experiencing subject and the object being experienced dis­
appears. Because genius is, together with the true artistic work it creates, as Lavater pro­
claims long before Adorno's identically worded remark: "Apparition". Mere scholarly crit­
ical discourse is not a match for this premonition of romantic art criticism.23) 
But back to the start! God, nature, man — the thinking of the eighteenth century which 
tended towards the unification of concepts pushes these symbols closer and closer together. 
In the image of genius they approach each other to the point of being almost indistinguish­
able. Herder's tableau which he himself represents as a "monstrous image", is an easily re­
membered example: "Sitting high upon a rocky cliff, thunderstorms and the roaring of the 
sea at his feet, but his head in the rays of the heavens!"24) Herder likes to add the attribute 
"creative" to the concept of genius to distinguish it from productivity in non­artistic do­
mains. In the tableau quoted above, the features of the Old Testament God of creation and 
lawmaking coincide with the characteristics of the human double­nature. This shares in the 
material, chaotic process of creation and at the same time in the clarifying ordering spirit. 
21) Cf. Giinter Peters: Der zerrissene Engel. Geniedsthetik und literarische Selbstdarstellung im achtzehnten 
Jahrhundert, Mtinchen 1982. 
22) Cf. Dieckmann op. cit., 14. 
23) Lavater op. cit., 81. Theodor W. Adorno: Asthetische Theorie, Frankfurt/M. 1972, 125. 
24) "Hoch auf einem Felsengipfel sitzend, zu seinen FtiBen Sturm, Ungewitter und Brausen des Meers, aber sein 
Haupt in Strahlen des Himmels." Johann Gottfried Herder: "Schakespear". In: Herders Werke, II, 
Berlin/Weimar 1969, 237. 
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Using the image of the "human statue", that stark anthropos-model from Condillac's work­
shop, Herder developed and verbally propagated the self­creation of man with a greater ex­
penditure of thought and energy than practically anyone else. However, this self­creation 
presupposes the profaning of a metaphysical heaven. 
Herder's comparison of Shakespeare with the "giant God of Spinoza" offers us a crucial 
hint. Because Spinoza's system of metaphysical criticism, which became the standard for 
so many philosophers of the Enlightenment and post­Enlightenment eras, shows that the 
symbol "God" is no more and no less than an epitomized symbol for that mathematically 
provable law immanent to nature, which sums up all the individual components of the uni­
verse into a relatively well­functioning whole. If the transcendency of a de­personalized 
God were transposed to the earthly world, then it would only be consistent also to give man 
an all­powerful position, at least in the realm of recognition.25) 
Whoever agreed with the metaphysical criticism of Spinoza was well equipped with 
sound arguments to defend the autonomy of creative man. At the same time, he had the li­
cense to read the sacred texts as imaginative works and to exploit their imagery for the pur­
pose of poetically describing the figure of genius.26) 
However, nothing human is without a dark side. It is just a difference in nuance 
whether Herder's genius sits on a cliff or is chained to it like Prometheus. Creative man is 
solitary. Genius cannot be measured in ordinary terms and is practically outlawed because 
he does not fall into line with any order or subjugate himself to any rule: "without any order 
or regularity", as Addison said, or "regular disorder", as Hamann wrote.27) That is the para­
doxical being called genius. 
Ever since the Renaissance had enhanced the status of classical humoural pathology, it 
has commonly been thought that creative man possessed — at least in the figure of the artist 
— a melancholy temperament: "Melancolia significa ingegno." According to this theory, the 
melancholy genius lived on the edge of madness. Thus, a pathological deviation is attributed 
to artistic genius and reaffirms its special status when compared to ordinary reason.28) 
The eighteenth century did not deny this enhanced status "approval". Diderot calls ge­
nius "fou", Hamann admires its docta ignorantia and Kant outrightly considers it to be 
mentally disturbed.29) Kant's opinion is in no way meant to be disparaging: it rather marks 
the boundlessness of genius' nonconformity along with the limits of its definability. Genius 
simply does not fit into society. Indeed, it became society's critical countercharge and thus, 
the figure of the modern artist emerges from the iconography of creative man: something 
25) Cf. Panajotis Kondylis: Die neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik, Stuttgart 1990, 222 seqq. 
26) Spinoza: Tractatus-theologico-politicus, Opera I, ed. K. Blumenstock, Darmstadt 1979, 62 et pass. 
27) Addison: The Spectator, No. 160 [1711], Reprint: London 1954, 300. As to Hamann cf. J. Schmidt op. cit., 113 
seq. 
28) Cf. Erwin Panofsky: DasLeben und die Kunst Albrecht Durers, Munchen 1977, 221. See also R. Klibansky/E. 
Panofsky/F. Saxl: Saturn and Melancholy. Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art, 
Nendeln/Liechtenstein 1979. 
29) With regard to Diderot and Hamann cf. Dieckmann op. cit., 19, and J. Schmidt op. cit., 101 seqq. Kant: "Das 
Genie ist ein Gestorter, den ein anderer erstlich auslegen muB." quoted by R. Eisler: Kant-Lexikon, Berlin 
1930, 184. 
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between a quick-tempered Don Quijote and a reluctant individual whose new, sometimes 
negative ideas are either ahead of or against those of his time. The comparison of genius 
with God and the scientific explorers is terminated simultaneously: genius is God. His truth 
does not agree with theological or scientific models, but rather reveals itself in the fulfill­
ment of aesthetic experience. 
The sharp difference which Kant draws between productive work and creative Poesis 
justifies this view. As early as the end of the 1770's he noted: "A production without ge­
nius is labour."30) In other words creative man can only be found in the arts, above all in 
poetry. Everything else is either technical production on the basis of physical labour, or 
epistemological and moral legislation in civil service. The philosopher does not doubt that 
mankind can be the "creator of its happiness", but this, so he argues, can only be achieved if 
man does not simply follow his nature. This is a clear rejection of the identification of ge­
nius with a wild and unrestrained natural force. 
Kant's distinction gives the history of creative man a new direction. This change be­
comes most interesting when one reads it in the light of the expanding anthropological re­
search of that time. From that research emerged a newly recast image of man which then 
overthrew the traditional interchange between the symbols of God, nature and man.31) But 
some traits are survived not only as the popular imitation in the genius­is­crazy equation, 
but rather in the figure of the wanderer who roams through the great classical texts. This is 
a figure of movement, but unlike its older brother, the explorer, the wanderer roams freely 
in the land of aesthetic appearance, a symbolic embodiment of a truly limitless imagination. 
The wanderer is the aestheticized figure of creative man which appears again and again 
in the poetic texts of Goethe, Schiller and Holderlin.32) The wanderer is different from trav­
elers and the giant God in that he is constantly on the go. He is someone who moves, as his 
German name suggests, in turns, a literal Tropus. The path which he searchingly traverses 
may lead to error, a cause for both suffering and joy in creative invention. However, the 
crucial question remains: what is the wanderer searching for? The fact that he is searching 
at all is a sign that he is missing something. 
In Holderlin's and Schiller's great poems we find the answer. The creative movement 
of the wanderer is directed at the loss of nature and its mythological incarnation. More than 
any other poem, Schiller's Elegie of 1795 (later entitled "Der Spaziergang") portrays the 
path of the wanderer who sees the arbitrarily accomplished evolution of culture sink into 
catastrophe: "in the ashes of the city, [he who represents humanity] searches for the nature 
that was lost."33) The Elegie shows what use the scientific and discovering genius brings to 
30) "Erne Produktion ohne Genie ist Arbeit", in: Materialien zu Kants "Kritik der Urteilskraft", ed. Jens 
Kulenkampff, Frankfurt/M. 1974, 99. 
31) Cf. S. Moravia: La scienza dell 'Uomo nel Settecento, Bari 1970; M. Duchet: Anthropologic et histoire au 
siecle des lumieres, Paris 1971; G. Gusdorf: Les sciences humaines et la pensee occidentale, V: Dieu, la nature 
et I'homme au siecle des lumieres, Paris 1972. 
32) E.g. Goethe: "Wandrers Sturmlied"; Schiller: "Der Spaziergang"; Holderlin: "Der Wanderer". As to the 
modern significance of this symbolic pattern cf. Roger Gilbert: Walks in the World. Representation and 
Experience in Modern American Poetry, Princeton NJ 1991. 
76 Dietrich HARTH 
humanity by juxtaposing the successful circumnavigation of the "Orbis Intellectualis" with 
the image of shipwreck: "High on the mountain of floods sways the demasted ship,/Behind 
clouds die out the persistent stars of the Plough,/Nothing is lasting any more, errant is even 
God in his bosom."34) 
Schiller's visionary wandering genius who surveys cultural history does not turn back 
from catastrophe to the raw nature whose creativity is just beginning to bud. Instead he re­
turns to its allegoric image. Here it appears as it does in Holderlin's wanderer fantasies: 
This return to the symbolic form of nature is concurrently the re­remembrance of the classi­
cal creation of art in which the ragged consciousness of the century once again evokes the 
unity of the great symbols. In Schiller's words: "Unter demselben Blau, Uber dem 
namlichen Griin/Wandeln die nahen und wandeln vereint die fernen Geschlechter,/Und die 
Sonne Homers, siehe! sie lachelt auch uns."35) Genius is, therefore, no longer an agent of 
the New, but is rather a representation of the deficiencies of the Modern. In this situation, it 
turns back in order to recall, anamnetically, in an obstinate, practically useless manner, that 
which was lost through the advancing amnesia which formed part of both the productive 
and destructive powers of modernization. 
This re­remembrance is not comparable to the preservation of memory in the service of 
education and museums. The anamnetic movement follows arbitrary creative urges, like 
the aimless movement of the wanderer contemplating nature.36) This "nature" represents 
not only that which the eye of the wanderer symbolically perceives, but it also indicates 
what is in danger: the unity of creator and creation. Nature is the "other" in which, if it 
were still possible, the unrest of the seeker could come to rest. Creative arbitrariness ex­
presses, therefore, the freedom to tie together the near with the far, the apparently out­dated 
with the recently imagined. In this way it preserves, in the light of the imaginary, that 
which was lost in the accelerated push for modernization: God­nature­man preserved as a 
unified symbol. That poetry alone can fulfill this task, as Schiller writes, is a thought fitting 
with its time, but nonetheless disquieting. While science, economics and politics objectify­
ingly dissect the old triad in small incoherent particles which are more easily digested, only 
poetry and the arts may still dream the timeless dream of a comprehensive and uninfected 
totality. This dream remains disturbing because it declares itself free from the day's labour 
with a pathetic gesture of rejection. 
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33) "In der Asche der Stadt sucht [er, der die Menschheit vertritt] die verlorne Natur." Friedrich Schiller, Sdmtliche 
Werke, ed. Fricke/Gopfert, I, 1973, 233. 
34) Schiller op. cit., 232: "Hoch auf der Fluten Gebirg wiegt sich entmastet der Kahn, / Hinter Wolken erloschen 
des Wagens beharrliche Sterne, / Bleibend ist nichts mehr, es irrt selbst in dem Busen der Gott." 
35) Schiller op. cit., 234. 
36) In 20th century postmodern poetry this tendency fosters a particular type of combinatory and artistic writing; 
cf. D. Harth: "Vision pessimiste de la civilisation ­ Fondement et limite de la production esthetique". In: Jean­
Marie Paul (Ed.): Le pessimisme, idee feconde, idee dangereuse, Nancy 1992, 207­225. 
